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     The relation between managerial ownership and firm value is one of the central 
issues in corporate finance. Two main schools of thought exist with very different 
starting points. One assumes that managerial ownership is exogenously determined, 
while the other assumes that it is endogenously determined. Regarding the exogenous 
assumption, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), and McConnell and Servaes (1990) 
find a significant non-linear relation between managerial ownership and firm value, 
and argue that it is consistent with both the incentive alignment hypothesis and the 
managerial entrenchment hypothesis.  Regarding the endogenous assumption, 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985), and Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) find that the 
relation between managerial ownership and firm value is insignificant. They argue 
that this finding is consistent with the interpretation that firms optimally choose 
managerial ownership to maximize their value. In that case, no empirical relation 
between managerial ownership and firm value reflects the equilibrium outcome. As 
suggested by Core and Larcker (2002), the essential difference between these two 
viewpoints is the assumption regarding the adjustment cost required to correct sub-
optimal contracts. For example, Morck et al. (1988) implicitly assume that firms are 
unable to re-contract optimally due to the tremendous adjustment cost involved, while 
Demsetz et al. (1985) implicitly assume that firms can re-contract without incurring 
any cost. Other studies generally take one of these two standpoints. 
     Core and Larcker (2002) try to reconcile these two schools of thought, and propose 
a transaction cost theory on managerial ownership and firm value. They begin with a 
new assumption that the adjustment cost is neither too large nor too small, so that 
firms only conduct periodical re-contracting. Firms choose optimal managerial 
ownership when they contract, but managerial ownership can deviate from the 
optimal level after contracting, and the firms periodically re-optimize ownership. A 
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new hypothesis arises from this assumption: Deviation from an optimal managerial 
ownership level to a sub-optimal level can reduce firm value. Core and Larcker (2002) 
have conducted empirical tests to explore their hypothesis in the research setting of a 
mandatory managerial ownership increase. They examined a sample of firms that had 
adopted a target ownership plan, under which managers were required to own a 
minimum amount of stock. They found that after the adoption of such a mandatory 
ownership increase, an improvement in firm performance had taken place. Thus, they 
conclude that the empirical evidence supports the transaction cost theory. 
     Although Core and Larcker (2002) propose a new transaction cost theory on 
managerial ownership and firm value, we have some concerns about how they draw 
their conclusions based on their empirical tests. Core and Larcker (2002) only 
conducted the empirical tests on one side of deviation from the optimal ownership, i.e., 
the below-optimal deviation, as the target ownership plan they utilize corresponds 
with the below-optimal deviation.1 However, it is important to conduct empirical tests 
on both sides of optimal ownership when one attempts to test the transaction cost 
theory on managerial ownership and firm value. This is due to the fact that alternative 
explanations can be raised based on the findings in Core and Larcker (2002), which 
may potentially undermine their conclusion that the results support the transaction 
cost theory. Generally, Core and Larcker (2002) find an increasing relation between 
managerial ownership and firm value by studying the below-optimal situation. 
However, alternative theories may also predict an increasing relation between 
ownership and firm value. For example, Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose an 
incentive alignment hypothesis which predicts a strictly increasing relation between 
ownership and firm value. In this case, we cannot tell whether the results in Core and 
                                                 
1 Core and Larcker explain that “… target ownership plans are designed to address the contention of 
some researchers and governance activists that stock ownership of senior-level executives is ‘too 
small’…”(Core and Larcker, 2002, p320). Therefore, this corresponds to the below-optimal situation. 
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Larcker (2002) support the transaction cost theory or the incentive alignment 
hypothesis, as the empirical findings in their paper are consistent with the predictions 
of both theories. 
     The motivation of this paper is to test the transaction cost theory on managerial 
ownership and firm value by studying the relation between the deviations on both 
sides of optimal CEO ownership and firm value. By doing this, we will be able to 
differentiate between the transaction cost theory and alternative theories, as the 
predictions on both the above-optimal deviation and the below-optimal deviation are 
uniquely from the transaction cost theory. 
     We use the Execucomp database to get the panel data for a sample of 1058 firms 
over the period from 1995 to 2000. We focus on CEO ownership in this study.2 Panel 
data have an advantage over cross-sectional data, as firm fixed effect regression can 
be used to control for unobservable heterogeneity in the firms’ contracting 
environment, which mitigates the serious omitted variable problem in the cross-
sectional analysis. We follow Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999), and use a firm 
fixed effect regression as the benchmark to estimate the determinants of optimal CEO 
ownership, and find that the ownership is determined by both unobservable and 
observable contracting parameters. We use the residuals in the firm fixed effect 
regression as the measure for the deviations from optimal CEO ownership, and study 
their relation with firm value. Since the residuals can be either positive or negative, 
they correspond with both above-optimal and below-optimal deviations. This 
methodology follows Harford (1999), and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2006). Harford 
                                                 
2 The Execucomp database provides data for the five most highly compensated executives in the firms. 
We use CEO ownership due to the data availability. The literature has used different definitions for 
managerial ownership: Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), for example, define managerial ownership 
as the percentage of shares owned by the entire board, while McConnell and Servaes (1990) define it as 
the percentage of shares owned by insiders. Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) define managerial 
ownership as the percentage of shares owned by the CEO. 
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(1999) uses a firm fixed effect regression as the benchmark to estimate the optimal 
level of corporate cash holdings. He defines the predicted value as the measure for 
optimal cash holdings, and uses the residuals in the firm fixed effect regression as the 
measure for excess corporate cash holdings. He concludes that excess corporate cash 
holdings have a significant impact on firm performance through acquisitions. Dittmar 
and Mahrt-Smith (2006) use a similar methodology, and get the measure of excess 
corporate cash holdings from the residuals in a firm fixed effect regression as the 
benchmark for optimal corporate cash holdings. 
     We study the relation between the deviations from optimal CEO ownership and the 
level of firm value. We find that on average, a 1% deviation from optimal CEO 
ownership reduces firm value, measured as Tobin’s Q, by 5.6%, and that the 
deviations on both sides of optimal CEO ownership reduce firm value. Moreover, we 
find no relation between CEO ownership and firm value, while both unobservable and 
observable contracting parameters are important determinants of firm value. These 
findings provide an important link between the two stands in the literature. Namely, if 
ownership adjustments are costly, firms can deviate from the equilibrium, leading to 
our finding that the deviations from optimal ownership are value reducing. At the 
same time, if the adjustment costs are similar in both directions, on average, firms are 
still at the equilibrium ownership that maximizes firm value, as the positive and 
negative deviations offset each other in the large sample.  
     We study the relation between deviations from CEO ownership and the change in 
firm value. We examine four events which change CEO ownership: insider selling, 
insider purchase, seasoned equity offerings and open market repurchases. We find 
that the change in CEO ownership is associated with a higher abnormal return if it 
moves CEO ownership towards the optimal level, while the change in CEO 
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ownership is associated with a lower abnormal return if it moves CEO ownership 
away from the optimal level. 
     These findings support the interpretation that the deviations on both sides of 
optimal CEO ownership reduce firm value. We conclude that they are consistent with 
the transaction cost theory on managerial ownership and firm value. 
     The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 reviews the literature and develops 
the hypothesis. Section 2 describes the sample and variables. Section 3 describes the 
methodology used for obtaining the measures of deviations from optimal CEO 
ownership. Section 4 examines the relation between the deviations and the level of 
firm value. Section 5 examines the relation between the deviations and the change in 
firm value. We conclude in Section 6. 
 
 
1. Literature review and hypothesis development 
1.1. Literature review 
     Two main schools of thought take very different starting points regarding the 
relation between managerial ownership and firm value. One assumes that managerial 
ownership is exogenously determined, while the other assumes that it is endogenously 
determined. 
     Regarding the exogenous assumption, Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose an 
incentive alignment hypothesis which predicts a strictly increasing relation between 
firm value and ownership. Stulz (1988) argues that managerial ownership may have 
either an incentive alignment effect or an entrenchment effect, depending on the level. 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) find a piecewise linear relation between Tobin’s Q 
and managerial ownership, where Q increases when ownership is below 5%, then 
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decreases to the 5%-25% range, and again turns positive when ownership is above 
25%. McConnell and Servaes (1990) find an inverted-U shaped relation between Q 
and managerial ownership. The curve slopes upward until insider ownership reaches 
40% to 50%, and then slopes downward. Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) corroborate 
the findings in Morck et al. (1988) by showing that Q increases with ownership up to 
1%, the relation is negative in the 1%-5% range, becomes positive in the 5%-20% 
range, and turns negative again when ownership exceeds 20%. These studies interpret 
the positive relation between ownership and firm value as supportive evidence for the 
incentive alignment effect, and the negative relation supporting the entrenchment 
effect. 
     Regarding the endogenous assumption, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that if 
firms choose managerial ownership optimally, there will be no relation between firm 
value and managerial ownership in the regression, once all the exogenous parameters 
are controlled for. They find no relation between accounting performance and the 
concentration of managerial ownership. Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) 
extend the study by using panel data, and argue that both managerial ownership and 
firm performance are determined by exogenous changes in the firm’s contracting 
environment. They find no direct relation between managerial ownership and firm 
performance. These studies interpret their findings as supportive evidence that firms 
are optimizing their ownership to maximize firm value. The literature on executive 
compensation (e.g., Murphy, 1985; Jensen and Murphy, 1990) and on the 
determinants of equity incentive and grants (e.g., Core and Guay, 1999, 2001) also 
supports the hypothesis that managerial equity incentive is endogenously determined 
by the firm characteristics.  
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1.2. Hypothesis development 
     Core and Larcker (2002) propose the transaction cost theory on managerial 
ownership and firm value, and try to reconcile these two different viewpoints. First, 
they argue that the essential difference between these two positions is the assumption 
regarding the adjustment cost of re-contracting. The exogenous assumption implicitly 
assumes that the adjustment cost is so large that firms are unable to re-contract, while 
the endogenous assumption implicitly assumes that firms can re-contract at no cost. 
Next, they make the new assumption that the adjustment cost is neither too large nor 
too small. As a result, firms choose optimal managerial ownership when they contract, 
but are prevented from continuous re-contracting by adjustment costs. Therefore, 
managerial ownership may deviate from the optimal level with firms only re-
optimizing periodically. 
     The motivation of this paper is to test the transaction cost theory on ownership and 
firm value by studying the relation between the deviations on both sides of optimal 
CEO ownership and firm value. By doing this, we can differentiate the transaction 
cost theory on managerial ownership and firm value from alternative theories. For 
example, the incentive alignment hypothesis (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) predicts a 
strictly increasing relation between ownership and firm value. If we suppose we can 
find that the deviations on both sides of optimal ownership reduce firm value, we will 
be able to differentiate between the transaction cost theory and the incentive 
alignment hypothesis, because Jensen and Meckling (1976) do not predict such a 
decreasing relation between ownership and firm value. We test the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The deviations on both sides of optimal ownership reduce firm value. 
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2. Sample and variables 
2.1. Data and sample 
     The data come from the following sources. Data on CEO stock and option 
holdings are obtained from the Execucomp database. Stock return data are from the 
CRSP database, and the Compustat database is used as the source for firms’ financial 
data. Data on interest rates are obtained from the website of the Federal Reserve Bank. 
     The initial sample is obtained from the Execucomp database. We find firms that 
are continuously in the database from 1995 to 2000. We focus on balanced panel data, 
because the transaction cost theory on ownership and firm value can be viewed as a 
target-adjustment situation where firms periodically adjust CEO ownership to the 
optimal level. This follows literature on capital structure where balanced panel data 
are used in target-adjustment tests.3 Although the data are available in Execucomp 
from 1993, we focus on the period starting from 1995. This is due to the fact that an 
important regulation, the Internal Revenue Code 162(m), came into effect at the 
beginning of 1994.4 Perry and Zenner (2001) find that this regulation affects firms’ 
practice on incentive compensation due to tax considerations. In our view, the period 
of 1993 and 1994 can be regarded as a ‘confounding period’, because it is difficult to 
tell whether firms adjusted CEO ownership for contracting reasons or due to the tax 
code change. 5  Moreover, we focus on the period before the year 2000, because 
executives were likely to hold underwater options due to the market downturn 
                                                 
3 Jalilvand and Harris (1984), Titman and Wessels (1988), Auerbach (1985), and Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers (1999) eliminate firms for which continuous data are not available. 
4 The Internal Revenue Code 162(m) came into effect on January 1, 1994. It limits the tax deductibility 
of non-performance related compensation over one million dollars. 
5 In our view, the impact from tax code change exerted the strongest effect around the implementation 
of the code. While it is still possible that firms considered the tax effect when the CEO’s non-
performance pay exceeded one million dollars during the period in 1995-2000, this effect was much 
weaker because firms could have already made the adjustment around the tax code change in 
expectation of that. 
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beginning in 2001, while underwater options can distort the incentive. 6  We also 
exclude financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) and firms with incomplete data. After this 
screening process, we obtain the final sample of 1058 firms, with 6348 firm-year 
observations. 
2.2. Variables 
     In this section, we describe the variables used in the analysis.  
2.2.1. Firm value 
     We use Tobin’s Q as the proxy for firm value. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) 
argue that since Tobin’s Q is high when the firm has valuable intangible assets in 
addition to physical capital, it includes the impact of corporate governance. We 
calculate Tobin’s Q as the market value of equity (#199 multiplied by #25)7 minus the 
book value of equity (#60) plus the book value of assets (#6), divided by the book 
value of assets (#6). 
     In Section 5, we study how the deviations from optimal ownership affect the 
change in firm value by using event studies. We use cumulative abnormal return 
around a short window of the event date as the measure for the change in firm value. 
Cumulative abnormal return is calculated by using the market model with the CRSP 
equally weighted index as the market return. 
2.2.2. CEO ownership 
     Following the definition in Palia (2001), and Aggrawal and Samwick (2003), we 
calculate CEO ownership as the sum of the proportion of shares outstanding held by 
the CEO plus the proportion of shares outstanding in options held by the CEO times 
the Black-Scholes hedge ratio (the delta). This can be expressed as: 
 
                                                 
6 Execucomp does not provide data on underwater options. This is another reason that we focus on the 
period up to the year 2000. 
7 We use # to denote the Compustat item number. 
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              Z = [log ( S / X) + T (r - d + σ2 / 2)] / σ T(1/2)                                                        (3) 
     where N = cumulative probability function for the normal distribution 
                S = price of the underlying stock 
                X = exercise price 
                σ = expected stock return volatility over life of option  
                 r = risk-free interest rate 
                T = time to maturity of the option in years 
                d = expected dividend rate over life of option 
 
     Thus, our ownership proxy includes both stock and option ownership. We use the 
methodology in Core and Guay (1999, 2002) to calculate this measure. Core and 
Guay (2002) demonstrate that this methodology captures more than 99% of variation 
in option portfolio value and sensitivities. The details of the calculation are shown in 
Appendix B. 
2.2.3. Control variables 
     The control variables are used to proxy for the exogenous parameters in the firm’s 
contracting environment. These variables are related to the potential moral hazard and 
monitoring difficulty. However, as shown by Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999), 
a large part of the parameters are unobservable. It is therefore important to control for 
both unobservable and observable firm characteristics in the underlying contracting 
environment.  
We use firm fixed effect regression, which can control for unobservable firm 
characteristics as long as they are constant over time.  Moreover, previous research 
has found that CEO ownership can be affected by other corporate governance 
structures, such as the structure of the board (e.g., Core, Holthauren and Larcker, 
1999), whether the CEO is the founder of the company (e.g., Hall and Liebman, 1998), 
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and control over corporate resources (e.g., Cheng, Nagar and Rajan, 2004).8 However, 
since these corporate governance structures are relatively stable through time, they are 
captured by firm-specific intercepts. Therefore, using firm fixed effect regressions can 
account for the influence from these omitted variables. 
We follow Himmelberg et al. (1999), and include other variables as determinants 
of CEO ownership. We use the natural logarithm of assets (#6) as the proxy for firm 
size. We use the growth rate of sales (#12) as a proxy for growth opportunities. We 
use the sum of the ratio of research and development expenses (#46) to total expenses 
(#189) and the ratio of advertising expenses (#45) to total expenses (#189) as the 
proxy for soft capital. We use the ratio of income before extraordinary items (#18) to 
assets (#6) as the proxy for cash flow. We use the ratio of plant, property and 
equipment (#8) to assets (#6) as the proxy for capital intensity. We use the standard 
deviation of the ratio of income before extraordinary items (#18) to assets (#6) in the 
prior three years, and the standard deviation of the natural logarithm of sales (#12) in 
the prior three years as proxies for volatility in the operating environment. We also 
include the square of size and the square of cash flow as control variables.9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 In the exogenous ownership framework, the control perspective of the ownership brings about the 
agency problem of managerial entrenchment (e.g., Stulz, 1988). However, in the endogenous 
ownership framework, the degree of control can also be regarded as one of the firm characteristics. 
Cheng, Nagar and Rajan (2004) find that managerial ownership changes around the anti-takeover 
legislation. In their study, managerial ownership is assumed endogenous, and determined by firm 
characteristics, including the degree of control and the variables in Demsetz and Lehn (1985). 
9 See Himmelberg et al. (1999) for a detailed explanation on the rationales for these variables. 
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3. Deviations from optimal CEO ownership 
     In this section, we describe the methodology used for obtaining the measures of 
deviations from optimal CEO ownership.  
     We need to find a benchmark specification for optimal CEO ownership. Following 
Himmerberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999), we use a firm fixed effect regression as the 
benchmark regression for the determinants of CEO ownership.  
 
CEO ownershipit  
= ai + c1(Sizeit) + c2(Size squareit) + c3(Cash flowit) + c4(Cash flow squareit) 
+ c5(Sales growthit) + c6(Plant, property and equipmentit)  
+ c7(R&D and advertisingit) + c8(Earnings volatilityit)  
+ c9(Sales volatilityit) + εit                                                                                         (4) 
 
where Deviationit = | εit | 
 
     In equation (4), ai represents firm specific intercepts, capturing both unobservable 
parameters and observable, but omitted parameters in the contracting environment, as 
long as they are constant through time. The predicted value in this regression is used 
as the measure for optimal CEO ownership. 
      Equation (4) also generates the measure for the deviation from optimal CEO 
ownership, which will be used for later analysis. We use the absolute value of the 
residuals εit as our proxy for the deviations from optimal CEO ownership. The 
residuals are not explained by the firm’s contracting environment, thus corresponding 
with the assumption of the transaction cost theory that managerial ownership can 
exogenously deviate from the optimal level.  
     This methodology follows Harford (1999), and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2006). 
Harford (1999) uses a firm fixed effect regression as the benchmark to estimate the 
optimal level of corporate cash holdings. He defines the predicted value as the 
measure for optimal cash holdings, and uses the residuals in the firm fixed effect 
regression as the measure for excess corporate cash holdings. Harford (1999) 
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concludes that excess corporate cash holdings have a significant impact on firm 
performance through acquisitions. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2006) use a similar 
methodology, and obtain the measure of excess corporate cash holdings from the 
residuals in a firm fixed effect regression. 
 
 
4. Deviations and the level of firm value 
4.1. Methodology 
     We test the main hypothesis by studying the relation between deviations from 
optimal ownership and the level of firm value. Since firm value is affected by the 
same contracting parameters as the determinants of ownership (Himmerberg, Hubbard 
and Palia, 1999), we use firm fixed effect regressions with the same control variables. 
We also include deviation from optimal CEO ownership in the regression.10 
 
Firm valueit  
= ai + b1(Deviationit) + c1(Sizeit) + c2(Size squareit) + c3(Cash flowit) 
+ c4(Cash flow squareit) + c5(Sales growthit) + c6(Plant, property and equipmentit) 
+ c7(R&D and advertisingit) + c8(Earnings volatilityit)  
+ c9(Sales volatilityit) + ηit                                                                                         (5) 
 
     According to Hypothesis 1, we expect b1 < 0 in equation (5). 
     In order to test whether the deviations on both sides of optimal CEO ownership 
reduce firm value, the deviation is interacted with a dummy variable indicating above-
optimal deviation. The above-optimal dummy is one if actual CEO ownership is 
greater than optimal CEO ownership, i.e., the predicted ownership from equation (4), 
and is zero otherwise.  
 
                                                 
10 Zhou (2001) questions the use of fixed effect regressions in studying the relation between managerial 
ownership and firm value, as managerial ownership changes slowly from year to year within a firm. 
However, this paper focuses on how the residuals in the fixed effect regression affect firm value. The 
time-invariant fixed effects are not included in the residuals. 
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Firm valueit  
= ai + b2(Deviationit) + b3((Deviation*Above-optimal dummy)it) + c1(Sizeit)  
+ c2(Size squareit) + c3(Cash flowit) + c4(Cash flow squareit) + c5(Sales growthit) 
+ c6(Plant, property and equipmentit) + c7(R&D and advertisingit)  
+c8(Earnings volatilityit) + c9(Sales volatilityit) + ηit                                                 (6) 
 
     According to Hypothesis 1, we expect b2 < 0 and b2 + b3 < 0 in equation (6).11 
4.2. Results 
4.2.1. Univariate statistics 
     Table 1 presents univariate statistics of the variables. The data are winsorized at 
1% and 99%. Panel A shows that the mean of CEO ownership is 3.50%, and the 
median is 1.05%. Panel A also indicates that the mean of Tobin’s Q is 1.98, while the 
median is 1.48. The magnitudes of both CEO ownership and Tobin’s Q are 
comparable to the findings in Aggrawal and Samwick (2003), which use a similar 
methodology and database. Panel B shows univariate statistics of other control 
variables.  
4.2.2. The determinants of optimal CEO ownership 
     Table 2 presents the results of the determinants of optimal CEO ownership. We 
first compare the results between OLS and firm fixed effect regressions. Panel A 
shows that there are substantial differences in the estimates.  For example, the 
estimate on earnings volatility is -0.135 in the OLS regression, but is -0.031 in the 
firm fixed effect regression. This suggests that in our sample, OLS regression may 
produce biased estimates due to an omitted variable problem. The firm fixed effect 
regression is shown to be a better specification for the determinants of optimal CEO 
ownership for two further reasons. First, Panel A shows that the adjusted R-square is 
0.90 in the firm fixed effect regression. This magnitude is consistent with the findings 
in Himmelberg et al. (1999). Panel A also shows that the adjusted R-square is only 
                                                 
11 In equation (6), b2 represents the below-optimal situation, and b2 + b3 represents the above-optimal 
situation. 
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0.09 in the OLS regression. This marked difference in the adjusted R-square supports 
the position that unobservable contracting parameters are important determinants of 
optimal CEO ownership. Second, we conduct an F-test on the null hypothesis of equal 
intercepts across the firms. It rejects the null hypothesis at the 1% level. This therefore 
indicates that the intercepts in the firm fixed effect regression are indeed firm-specific. 
From these findings, we can conclude that the firm fixed effect specification is better 
suited as our benchmark model for optimal CEO ownership. 
     Panel B of Table 2 shows univariate statistics on predicted CEO ownership using 
the firm fixed effect specification. Predicted CEO ownership is used as the proxy for 
optimal CEO ownership. We find that the mean of optimal CEO ownership is 3.50%, 
while the median is 1.23%. The 5th percentile is 0.06%; and the 95th percentile is 
16.49%. Compared with actual CEO ownership, this indicates that the parameters in 
firms’ contracting environments can explain a large part of CEO ownership, while 
deviations only account for a relatively small proportion. Panel B also shows 
univariate statistics on the residuals from the firm fixed effect regression. The 
residuals are winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
4.2.3. Deviation from optimal CEO ownership and the level of firm value 
     Table 3 presents the results on the deviation from optimal CEO ownership and the 
level of firm value using firm fixed effect regressions. The dependent variable is 
Tobin’s Q. The deviation from optimal CEO ownership is defined as the absolute 
value of the residuals. In the first column, we find that the estimate on the deviation 
from optimal CEO ownership is -5.658, which is significant. This indicates that on 
average, a deviation from optimal CEO ownership reduces firm value. The results 
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show that the estimates on most of the observable contracting parameters are 
significant. 12 
     The second column in Table 3 shows the results with the interaction term, which 
test explicitly whether the deviations on both sides of optimal CEO ownership reduce 
firm value. The second column shows that the estimate on deviation is negative         
(-5.998), and the sum of the estimate on deviation and the estimate on the interaction 
term between deviation and the above-optimal dummy (-5.998 + 0.851 = -5.147) is 
also negative. We conduct the F-test on the null hypothesis that the sum of the 
estimates on Deviation and Deviation * Above-optimal dummy is zero. It rejects the 
null hypothesis at the 1% level. These results therefore support the hypothesis that the 
deviations on both sides of optimal CEO ownership reduce firm value. 
4.3. Size-adjusted deviations and firm value 
     We conduct the robustness check by using size-adjusted deviations, which are 
defined as deviations divided by firm size. This is due to the consideration that firm 
size may affect the magnitude of deviations. For example, since it is more costly for a 
CEO to purchase a certain fraction of ownership of a large firm than of a small firm, 
we may find more deviations from optimal ownership in large firms, because the CEO 
cannot afford to purchase enough shares to reach the optimal level. In this case, the 
magnitude of deviations may capture the size effect. Therefore, we conduct the 
robustness check by using size-adjusted deviations which are the deviations 
standardized by firm size. 
     In Table 4, we find similar results by using size-adjusted deviations. In the first 
column, the estimate on Size-adjusted deviation is -1.040, which is significant. The 
                                                 
12 In the OLS regression for the first column of Table 3 (not shown in the table), the adjusted R-square 
is 0.48. Compared with the adjusted R-square 0.92 in the fixed effect regression, this indicates that the 
unobservable contracting parameters also have a substantial explaining power for firm value. 
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second column shows that the size-adjusted deviations on both sides of optimal CEO 
ownership reduce firm value. 
4.4. CEO ownership and firm value 
     We study the relation between CEO ownership and firm value, as the transaction 
cost theory predicts that there is no overall cross-sectional relation between CEO 
ownership and firm value as firms re-optimize CEO ownership periodically. Table 5 
presents the results of CEO ownership and firm value using a firm fixed effect 
regression. The estimate on CEO ownership is 0.369, which is insignificant. At the 
same time, the estimates on most of the contracting parameters are still significant in 
the regression. This suggests that, after controlling for exogenous contracting 
parameters, there is no relation between CEO ownership and Tobin’s Q. These results 
are consistent with the transaction cost theory. 
     The results in Table 3 and Table 5 reveal another contribution of this paper. 
Previous papers in this literature (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Himmelberg et al., 
1999) interpret the finding of no relation between ownership and firm value as the 
supportive evidence for the hypothesis that ownership always stays at the optimal 
level. However, the transaction cost theory gives a different interpretation. While 
Table 3 shows that the deviations on both sides of optimal ownership reduce firm 
value, Table 5 shows that there is no overall relation between firm value and CEO 
ownership itself. These results support the interpretation that since the deviations are 
random and symmetrically distributed on both sides of optimal ownership, we will not 
find an overall relation between firm value and CEO ownership itself, because the 
increasing relation and decreasing relation offset each other if we pool together the 
observations in the below-optimal situation and the above-optimal situation. 
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5. Deviations and the change in firm value 
     In this section, we study how changes in CEO ownership can affect changes in 
firm value. We use the same variable “Above-optimal dummy” in the previous 
analysis as the measure for deviations from optimal CEO ownership.   
If there is a deviation from optimal CEO ownership, then we expect that the 
change in CEO ownership will increase firm value if it moves CEO ownership 
towards the optimal level, and decreases firm value if it moves CEO ownership away 
from the optimal level. 
5.1. Data and methodology 
     We examine four events that can alter CEO ownership. First, we study insider 
selling and insider purchase, because they change the number of shares held by the 
CEO. Second, we study seasoned equity offerings and open market repurchases, 
because they change the total number of shares outstanding, which consequently 
changes the proportion of shares held by the firm’s CEO. 
5.1.1. Insider selling and insider purchase 
     We obtain data on insider selling and insider purchase from the Thomson Financial 
Insider database covering the period 1996 through 2000. In this sample period, 
insiders were required to report trading in their firms’ shares to the Securities and 
Exchange Committee (SEC) by the 10th of the month following the trade. We focus 
on a subset of the reported trades. First, we include the trading of at least 10,000 
shares. Second, we only consider open market selling and purchase. Finally, we only 
include the trading reported to the SEC by the 10th of the month following the trade, 
thus excluding the trading with lagged reporting.  
     Following McConnell, Servaes and Lins (2005), we set the date on which the 
insider trading is reported to the SEC (SEC receipt date) as the event date, as the 
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information becomes available to investors after insiders file their transaction to the 
SEC (e.g., Lakonishok and Lee, 2001). We use the cumulative abnormal return13 in    
(-5, +10) days around the event date as the measure for the change in firm value for 
insider selling, and use the cumulative abnormal return in (-1, +4) days around the 
event date as the measure for the change in firm value for insider purchase.14 
     Since insider selling can be associated with option exercises, this may confound 
the analysis due to the intervals between option exercises and insider selling. Since 
the sample period in this paper is from 1996 to 2000, insiders were allowed to 
immediately sell shares after option exercises.15 Ofek and Yermack (2000) find that 
managers sell nearly all the shares after the option exercises. Carpenter and Remmers 
(2001) study insider trading based on the assumption that insiders sell shares 
immediately after the option exercises. In the sample of insider selling, we exclude 
the events with longer intervals between option exercises and insider selling. We 
obtain the data on option exercises from Thomson Financial. Since we use the SEC 
receipt date as the event date, we only include the events in the sample if both option 
exercises and insider selling had already taken place before the SEC receipt date. This 
is to ensure that insider selling had already occurred when investors received the 
information.16  
     By using the above screening procedures, our sample contains 1266 insider selling 
events and 303 insider purchase events. 
                                                 
13  Cumulative abnormal return is calculated by using the market model with the CRSP equally 
weighted index as the market return. See Appendix A for a more detailed description. 
14 We find qualitatively similar results when we use the cumulative abnormal return in (-5, +10) days 
around the event date as the measure for the change in firm value for insider purchase. 
15 Insiders were allowed to sell shares immediately after option exercises after the year 1991. Before 
that, insider had been required to hold the shares obtained through option exercises for six months 
before selling them (Carpenter and Remmers, 2001). 
16 Since insider trading needs to be reported to the SEC by the 10th of the month following the trade, it 
means that the sample can include some events with short intervals between option exercises and 
insider selling, as long as they both take place before the SEC receipt date. 
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      We expect that insider selling will be associated with a higher abnormal return for 
an above-optimal deviation than a below-optimal deviation. Since insider selling 
reduces CEO ownership, it moves CEO ownership towards the optimal level where 
there has previously been an above-optimal deviation, and moves CEO ownership 
away from the optimal level where there has been a below-optimal deviation. 
Similarly, we expect that insider purchase will be associated with a lower abnormal 
return for an above-optimal deviation than a below-optimal deviation. 
     We use the following regressions for insider selling and insider purchase.  We use 
the change of various contracting parameters as control variables in the regressions, as 
both the change in firm value and the change in CEO ownership are driven by the 
change of contracting parameters in the contracting framework (e.g., Himmelberg, 
Hubbard and Palia, 1999). We also include a prior 6-month run-up in the regression. 
The run-up is used to control for potential overvaluation or undervaluation (e.g., 
Faccio and Masulis, 2005). 
 
Insider selling:      Abnormal returni  
= a + b4 ((Above-optimal dummy t-1)i) + c1(Size changei)  
+ c2(Cash flow changei) + c3(Sales growth changei)  
+ c4(Property, plant and equipment changei) + c5(R&D changei)  
+ c6(Earning volatility changei) + c7(Sales volatility changei) 
+ c8(Run-upi) + ηi                                                                                                 (7) 
 
Insider purchase:  Abnormal returni  
= a + b5((Above-optimal dummy t-1)i) + c1(Size changei)  
+ c2(Cash flow changei) + c3(Sales growth changei)  
+ c4(Property, plant and equipment changei) + c5(R&D changei)  
+ c6(Earning volatility changei) + c7(Sales volatility changei)  
+ c8(Run-upi) + ηi                                                                                               (8) 
 
     According to Hypothesis 1, we expect b4 > 0 in equation (7), and b5 < 0 in equation 
(8).  
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5.1.2. Seasoned equity offerings and open market repurchases 
    Data on seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) and open market repurchases are 
obtained from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database over the period from 
1996 to 2000. However, since firms are not obliged to repurchase shares after 
announcements, we only consider in our analysis the firms that actually repurchase 
shares. We use the data item for repurchases from the Compustat Quarterly database 
(#93) to identify the firms that actually repurchased shares. We define the firm as the 
one that actually repurchases shares, if it is reported in SDC and its data item for 
repurchases in Compustat is positive in the same year. As a result, the sample contains 
267 seasoned equity offerings events and 1184 open market repurchases events.  
     We set the announcement date of SEOs or open market repurchases as the event 
date. We use the cumulative abnormal return in (-10, +10) days around the 
announcement date as the measure for the change in firm value for SEOs, and use the 
cumulative abnormal return in (-5, +5) days around the announcement date as the 
measure for the change in firm value for open market repurchases.17 
     We expect that SEOs will be associated with a higher abnormal return for an 
above-optimal deviation than a below-optimal deviation. An SEO increases the total 
number of shares outstanding, which consequently reduces the proportion of shares 
held by the CEO. Therefore, an SEO moves CEO ownership towards the optimal 
level where an above-optimal deviation has previously existed, and moves CEO 
ownership away from the optimal level where there has been a below-optimal 
deviation. Similarly, we expect that open market repurchases will be associated with a 
lower abnormal return for an above-optimal deviation than a below-optimal deviation. 
                                                 
17 We find qualitatively similar results when we use the cumulative abnormal return in (-10, +10) days 
around the event date as the measure for the change in firm value for open market repurchases. 
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     We use the following regressions for SEOs and repurchases. The changes of 
various contracting parameters and a prior 6-month run-up are also used as control 
variables. 
 
SEOs:                    Abnormal returni  
= a + b6((Above-optimal dummy t-1)i) + c1(Size changei)  
+ c2(Cash flow changei) + c3(Sales growth changei) 
+ c4(Property, plant and equipment changei) + c5(R&D changei)  
+ c6(Earning volatility changei) + c7(Sales volatility changei)  
+ c8(Run-upi) + ηi                                                                                              (9) 
 
Repurchases:      Abnormal returni  
= a + b7((Above-optimal dummy t-1)i) + c1(Size changei)  
+ c2(Cash flow changei) + c3(Sales growth changei)  
+ c4(Property, plant and equipment changei) + c5(R&D changei) 
+ c6(Earning volatility changei) + c7(Sales volatility changei)  
+ c8(Run-upi) + ηi                                                                                               (10) 
 
     According to Hypothesis 1, we expect b6 > 0 in equation (9), and b7 < 0 in equation 
(10). 
5.2. Results 
5.2.1. Univariate statistics 
     Table 6 shows univariate statistics. Panel A shows that the median of the abnormal 
return of insider selling and insider purchase is -0.0040 and 0.0216, while the median 
of the abnormal return of SEOs and open market repurchases is -0.0172 and 0.0182. 
This is consistent with previous research, which finds a negative abnormal return for 
insider selling and SEOs, and a positive abnormal return for insider purchase and 
open market repurchases. Table 6 also reports univariate statistics of the prior 6-
month run-up in Panel B. 
5.2.2. Deviation from optimal CEO ownership and abnormal return 
     Table 7 illustrates the results of the relation between the deviation from optimal 
CEO ownership and the abnormal return associated with a change in CEO ownership. 
We conduct the univariate analysis in panel A. We divide the sample into two groups, 
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depending on whether CEO ownership is above or below the optimal level in the year 
t-1, and make comparisons between them.  
     Panel A shows that there is a significant difference in the abnormal return between 
these two sub-samples. For example, in the first row of panel A, we find that the mean 
of abnormal return for insider selling is -0.0127 for the sub-sample of below-optimal 
deviation, which is significant. However, the mean of abnormal return is -0.0012 for 
the sub-sample of above-optimal deviation, which is insignificant. This is consistent 
with the following interpretation. If there is a relation between CEO ownership and 
firm value through signaling (e.g., Leland and Pyle, 1977), then insider selling will 
reduce firm value, as it reduces CEO ownership. However, since insider selling also 
moves CEO ownership towards the optimal level in the situation of an above-optimal 
deviation, this can increase firm value. As a result, these two effects offset each other, 
so that we find no significant abnormal return in insider selling for the sub-sample of 
above-optimal deviation. 
     The rest of panel A shows similar patterns. We find that the sub-sample of above-
optimal deviation has a higher abnormal return in SEOs, and a lower abnormal return 
in insider purchase and open market repurchases. 
     Panel B of Table 7 shows the results of the regressions. In the first column, we find 
that the estimate on Above-optimal dummyt-1 is 0.011 for insider selling, which is 
significant. This is consistent with the viewpoint that insider selling is associated with 
a higher abnormal return in the case of above-optimal deviation by moving CEO 
ownership towards the optimal level. The other columns in panel B illustrate a similar 
pattern. We find that the estimate on Above-optimal dummyt-1 is positive and 
significant for SEOs, and the estimates on Above-optimal dummyt-1 are negative and 
significant for insider purchase and open market repurchases.  
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     In panel C of Table 7, we conduct a robustness check by including more control 
variables in the regressions. These variables are the lag of firm characteristics, which 
are used by previous papers in the literature. They can control for hypotheses based 
on the signaling theory and the agency theory. We find similar results in this panel. 
The estimates on Above-optimal dummyt-1 are positive and significant for insider 
selling and SEO regressions, while the estimates on Above-optimal dummyt-1 are 
negative and significant for insider purchase and repurchases regressions. 
     Therefore, the results in Table 7 are consistent with the hypothesis that both above-
optimal and below-optimal deviations reduce firm value.18 
5.3. Heckman two-stage estimation 
     Since firms may self-select themselves to undertake these events which change 
CEO ownership, it means that these events may not occur randomly. In this case, 
simple OLS regression is subject to an omitted variable problem with a non-randomly 
selected sample.19 We use the Heckman two-stage estimation as the treatment for this 
self selection problem. 
     In the first stage, we use probit regressions to model the decision of the firms to 
undertake these events. In each regression, we include the dummy variable, which 
indicates an above-optimal deviation in the year t-1. This allows us to study whether a 
deviation from optimal CEO ownership will affect the firm’s decision to alter CEO 
ownership. In the probit regressions of insider selling and insider purchase, we 
include various control variables, which are based on the literature about the 
                                                 
18 McConnell, Servaes and Lins (2005) study changes in insider ownership and changes in firm value 
in the situation of insider purchase. They do not find evidence for the optimal ownership explanation. 
We believe that the difference in the results can be due to the different sample used in the study. While 
McConnell et al. (2005) use the sample of purchase by all the insiders, we only use the sample of 
purchase by the CEO. Since it is possible that the optimal contracting framework is more relevant to 
the top management in the firm (e.g., the CEO) than other lower-ranked insiders, this can potentially 
explain the difference in the results between this paper and McConnell, Servaes and Lins (2005). 
19 See Heckman (1979) for more details. 
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determinants of insider trading (e.g., Seyhun, 1986; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001). In 
the probit regressions of SEOs and open market repurchases, we include various 
control variables, which are based on the literature about the determinants of SEOs or 
repurchases (e.g., Jung, Kim and Stulz, 1996; Kahle, 2002).20 
     From the probit regressions, we obtain the inverse Mills ratio as the omitted 
variable. In the second stage, we run the regressions with the inverse Mills ratio as an 
additional control variable. This provides treatment for the omitted variable problem 
from the firm’s self selection into these events. 
     Table 8 shows the results of the first stage of the Heckman two-stage estimation. 
The probit regressions are reported in the table. In the first column, we find that the 
estimate on Above-optimal dummyt-1 is 0.172 for insider selling, which is significant. 
This suggests that insider selling is more likely to take place in a firm whose CEO 
ownership is above the optimal level in the year t-1. In the last column, we find that 
the estimate on Above-optimal dummyt-1 is -0.073 for open market repurchases, 
which is significant, suggesting that open market repurchases are less likely to take 
place in a firm whose CEO ownership is above the optimal level in the year t-1. 
     Table 9 shows the results of the second stage of the Heckman two-stage estimation. 
The inverse Mills ratio, which is obtained from the first stage, is included in the 
regression. In panel A of Table 9, we find that the estimates on Above-optimal 
dummyt-1 have the same signs as in Table 7 while controlling for the inverse Mills 
ratio. Insider selling and SEOs are associated with a higher abnormal return for the 
above-optimal deviation by moving CEO ownership towards the optimal level, while 
insider purchase and open market repurchases are associated with a lower abnormal 
                                                 
20 These control variables are used to control for other reasons that can affect the likelihood of these 
events. For example, Stock returnt-1 can proxy for the potential overvaluation or undervaluation (e.g., 
Faccio and Masulis, 2005). We expect that if Stock returnt-1 is higher, insider selling and SEO will be 
more likely to take place, while insider purchase and open market repurchases will be less likely to 
occur. 
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return for the above-optimal deviation by moving CEO ownership away from the 
optimal level.  In panel B of Table 9, we find similar results by adding more control 
variables in the regressions. These results therefore suggest that, while controlling for 
a firm’s self selection, both above-optimal deviation and below-optimal deviation 
reduce firm value. 
5.4. Robustness Check about Option Exercises 
     Since insider selling can be associated with option exercises, the market reaction 
may be different depending on whether the insider selling is associated with option 
exercises. We conduct a robustness check and report the results in Table 10. In the 
regressions, we include an “Option exercise dummy”, which is one if insider selling is 
associated with option exercises, and is zero otherwise. We find similar results in this 
robustness check. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
     This paper tests the transaction cost theory on managerial ownership and firm 
value by studying the relation between deviations on both sides of optimal CEO 
ownership and firm value. This enables us to differentiate between the transaction 
cost theory and alternative theories, as the predictions on both the above-optimal 
deviation and the below-optimal deviation are uniquely from the transaction cost 
theory. We obtain a measure of the deviation from optimal CEO ownership, and find 
that deviations on both sides of optimal CEO ownership significantly reduce the level 
of firm value. Moreover, we conduct four event studies to examine how the deviation 
from optimal CEO ownership affects firm value when there is a change in CEO 
ownership. We find that the change in CEO ownership is associated with a higher 
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abnormal return if it moves CEO ownership towards the optimal level, while the 
change in CEO ownership is associated with a lower abnormal return if it moves CEO 
ownership away from the optimal level. 
     These findings support the interpretation that deviations on both sides of optimal 
CEO ownership reduce firm value. We conclude that they are consistent with the 
transaction cost theory on managerial ownership and firm value. 
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Appendix A 
Definition of the variables 
 
Panel A. CEO ownership, Tobin’s Q, and control variables 
 
 
CEO ownership 
 
CEO ownership is defined as the sum of the proportion of shares outstanding held 
by the CEO plus the proportion of shares outstanding in options held by the CEO 
times the Black-Scholes hedge ratio (the delta). Or: 
CEO ownership delta*
gOutstandin Shares#
CEOby  Held Options#
gOutstandin Shares #
CEOby  Held Shares # +=  
     with )(*
priceStock  
ue)option val Scholes-(Black
delta ZNe dT−=
∂
∂=  
              Z = [log ( S / X) + T (r - d + σ2 / 2)] / σ T(1/2) 
     where N = cumulative probability function for the normal distribution 
               S = price of the underlying stock 
               X = exercise price 
               σ = expected stock-return volatility over life of option  
                r = risk-free interest rate 
               T = time to maturity of the option in years 
               d = expected dividend rate over life of option 
     See Appendix B for more details on the calculation of this measure. 
 
Tobin’s Q 
 
Tobin’s Q is defined as the market value of equity (#25 multiplied by #199) plus 
the book value of assets (#6) minus the book value of common equity (#60), 
divided by the book value of assets (#6). We use # to denote the Compustat item 
number. 
 
Size 
 
Size is defined as the natural logarithm of the book value of assets (#6) 
 
Cash flow 
 
Cash flow is defined as the ratio of income before extraordinary items (#18) to 
assets (#6). 
 
Sales growth 
 
Sales growth is defined as the growth rate of sales (#12), calculated as the change 
in sales divided by the level of sales in the previous year. 
 
Plant, property and equipment 
 
Plant, property and equipment is defined as the ratio of plant, property and 
equipment (#8) to assets (#6). 
 
R&D and advertising 
 
R&D and advertising is defined as the ratio of the sum of research and 
development expenses (#46) plus advertising expenses (#45), divided by total 
expenses (#189). The missing value is set to zero. 
 
Earnings volatility 
 
Earnings volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the ratio of income 
before extraordinary items (#18) to assets (#6) in the prior three years. 
 
Sales volatility 
 
Sales volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the natural logarithm of 
sales (#12) in the prior three years. 
 
Leverage 
 
Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debt (#9) to assets (#6). 
 
Cash holdings 
 
Cash holdings are defined as the ratio of cash and marketable securities (#1) to 
assets (#6). 
 
Stock return 
 
Stock return is defined as one-year stock return. It is calculated as the sum of 
monthly return during the year. 
 
Stock return volatility 
 
Stock return volatility is defined as the annualized standard deviation of monthly 
return during the year.  
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Panel B. Abnormal return around the change in CEO ownership and run-up 
 
 
Abnormal return for insider selling 
 
Abnormal return for insider selling is defined as the cumulative abnormal return 
in (-5, +10) days around the event date, where the event date is the date that 
insider selling is reported to the SEC. Cumulative abnormal return is calculated 
by using the market model with the CRSP equally weighted index as the market 
return. In estimating the market model, we use the firm’s daily return and the 
return on the CRSP equally weighted index over days -300 to -46, where date 0 is 
the event date. 
 
Abnormal return for insider 
purchase 
 
Abnormal return for insider purchase is defined as the cumulative abnormal 
return in (-1, +4) days around the event date, where the event date is the date that 
insider purchase is reported to the SEC. Cumulative abnormal return is calculated 
by using the market model with the CRSP equally weighted index as the market 
return. In estimating the market model, we use the firm’s daily return and the 
return on the CRSP equally weighted index over days -300 to -46, where date 0 is 
the event date. 
 
Abnormal return for seasoned 
equity offerings 
 
Abnormal return for seasoned equity offerings is defined as the cumulative 
abnormal return in (-10, +10) days around the event date, where the event date is 
the announcement date. Cumulative abnormal return is calculated by using the 
market model with the CRSP equally weighted index as the market return. In 
estimating the market model, we use the firm’s daily return and the return on the 
CRSP equally weighted index over days -140 to -20, where date 0 is the event 
date. 
 
Abnormal return for open market 
repurchases 
 
Abnormal return for open market repurchases is defined as the cumulative 
abnormal return in (-5, +5) days around the event date, where the event date is 
the announcement date. Cumulative abnormal return is calculated by using the 
market model with the CRSP equally weighted index as the market return. In 
estimating the market model, we use the firm’s daily return and the return on the 
CRSP equally weighted index over days -300 to -46, where date 0 is the event 
date. 
 
Run-up 
 
Run-up is defined as the sum of the firm’s monthly return in the interval -6 to -1 
months. 
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Appendix B 
The calculation of CEO ownership 
 
     We calculate CEO ownership as the sum of the proportion of shares outstanding held by 
the CEO plus the proportion of shares outstanding in options held by the CEO times the 
Black-Scholes hedge ratio (the delta). This can be expressed as: 
 
     CEO Ownership delta*
gOutstandin Shares#
CEOby  Held Options#
gOutstandin Shares #
CEOby  Held Shares # +=               (1) 
     with )(*
priceStock  
ue)option val Scholes-(Black
delta ZNe dT−=∂
∂=                                        (2) 
              Z = [log ( S / X) + T (r - d + σ2 / 2)] / σ T(1/2)                                                        (3) 
 
     where N = cumulative probability function for the normal distribution 
                S = price of the underlying stock 
                X = exercise price 
                σ = expected stock return volatility over life of option  
                 r = risk-free interest rate 
                T = time to maturity of the option in years 
                d = expected dividend rate over life of option 
 
     We use the methodology in Core and Guay (1999, 2002) to calculate this measure. The 
incentive from stocks held by the CEO is calculated as follows: the stock holdings are 
obtained from Execucomp and divided by the number of shares outstanding.  
 
     The CEO option holdings are then divided into newly granted options and previously 
granted options. For newly granted options, all six elements are available for calculation: the 
exercise price of the option, time-to-maturity, the price of the underlying stock, expected 
dividend yield, expected stock return volatility, and risk-free interest rate. The exercise price 
of the option, time-to-maturity, and the price of the underlying stock are directly available 
from Execucomp. We use the dividend yield during the fiscal year as the proxy for expected 
dividend yield, which is also available from the Execucomp database. We use the annualized 
stock return volatility as the proxy for expected stock return volatility, calculated as the 
standard deviation of monthly stock return during the year multiplied by 12 . We get 10-year 
treasury constant maturity rate at the fiscal year end as the measure for risk-free interest rate. 
These data are obtained from the website of the Federal Reserve Bank.  
 
     For previously granted options, two elements are unavailable in the current year proxy 
statement: the exercise price and time-to-maturity. We compute the average exercise price of 
exercisable and unexercisable options by using the current realizable value from Execucomp. 
Then we set the time-to-maturity of unexercisable options equal to one year less than the 
time-to-maturity of the grant in the most recent year, and set the time-to-maturity of the 
exercisable option equal to three years less than the time-to-maturity of the unexercisable 
option.  
 
     Core and Guay (1999, 2002) provide more details on this methodology. 
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Table 1 
Univariate statistics 
 
This table reports univariate statistics on the variables. The sample consists of 1058 firms that are continuously in 
the Execucomp database from 1995 to 2000. Panel A reports univariate statistics on CEO ownership and Tobin’s 
Q. CEO ownership is defined as the sum of the proportion of shares outstanding held by the CEO plus the 
proportion of shares outstanding in options held by the CEO times the Black-Scholes hedge ratio (the delta). 
Tobin’s Q is the market value of equity plus the book value of assets minus the book value of common equity, 
divided by the book value of assets. Panel B reports univariate statistics on other variables. Size is the natural 
logarithm of the book value of assets. Cash flow is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to assets. Sales 
growth is the growth rate of sales, calculated as the change in sales divided by the level of sales in the previous 
year. Plant, property and equipment is the ratio of PPE to assets. R&D and advertising is the ratio of the sum of 
research and development expenses plus advertising expenses, divided by total expenses. Earnings volatility is the 
standard deviation of the ratio of income before extraordinary items to assets in the prior three years. Sales 
volatility is the standard deviation of the natural logarithm of sales in the prior three years. Leverage is the ratio of 
long-term debt to assets. Cash holdings are the ratio of cash and marketable securities to assets. Stock return is 
one-year stock return. Stock return volatility is the annualized standard deviation of monthly return during the year. 
 
 
Panel A. CEO ownership and Tobin’s Q 
 
Variable Mean Median 
 
CEO ownership 0.0350 0.0105 
 
Tobin’s Q 1.9896 1.4867 
 
 
Panel B. Other variables 
 
Variable Mean Median 
 
Size 21.3331 21.1677 
 
Cash flow 0.0475 0.0468 
 
Sales growth 0.1104 0.0886 
 
Plant, property and equipment 0.4883 0.2417 
 
R&D and advertising 0.1108 0.0000 
 
Earnings volatility 0.0294 0.0154 
 
Sales volatility 0.1038 0.0661 
 
Leverage 0.1964 0.1830 
 
Cash holdings 0.0952 0.0378 
 
Stock return 0.1814 0.1902 
 
Stock return volatility 0.3862 0.3437 
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Table 2 
Determinants of CEO ownership 
 
This table reports regressions on the determinants of CEO ownership. Panel A reports OLS and firm fixed effect 
regression on the determinants of CEO Ownership. The intercepts are not reported in this table. CEO ownership is 
defined as the sum of the proportion of shares outstanding held by the CEO plus the proportion of shares 
outstanding in options held by the CEO times the Black-Scholes hedge ratio (the delta). Size is the natural 
logarithm of the book value of assets. Cash flow is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to assets. Sales 
growth is the growth rate of sales, calculated as the change in sales divided by the level of sales in the previous 
year. Plant, property and equipment is the ratio of PPE to assets. R&D and advertising is the ratio of the sum of 
research and development expenses plus advertising expenses, divided by total expenses. Earnings volatility is the 
standard deviation of the ratio of income before extraordinary items to assets in the prior three years. Sales 
volatility is the standard deviation of the natural logarithm of sales in the prior three years. Panel B reports 
univariate statistics on the predicted CEO ownership and the residuals. Predicted CEO ownership is the predicted 
CEO ownership from the firm fixed effect regression, which is reported in panel A. Residuals are the residuals 
from the firm fixed effect regression, which is also reported in panel A. The p-value is noted in brackets. 
 
Panel A. Determinants of CEO ownership 
 
 OLS Firm fixed effect 
 CEO ownership CEO ownership 
Size -0.067 -0.053 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Size square 0.001 0.001 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash flow 0.053 0.016 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash flow square -0.031 -0.069 
 (0.57) (0.02) 
Sales growth 0.011 0.004 
 (0.01) (0.04) 
Plant, property and equipment -0.009 0.001 
 (0.01) (0.36) 
R&D and advertising -0.005 -0.009 
 (0.35) (0.17) 
Earnings volatility -0.135 -0.031 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Sales volatility 0.001 0.004 
 (0.93) (0.26) 
Adjusted R-square 0.09 0.90 
F-test on equal intercepts (p-value)  0.01 
 
 
Panel B. Predicted CEO ownership and the residuals from the firm fixed effect regression 
 
Variable Mean Median 5th percentile 95th percentile 
 
CEO ownership 0.0350 0.0105 0.0005 0.1757 
 
Predicted CEO ownership 0.0350 0.0123 0.0006 0.1649 
 
Residuals -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0231 0.0234 
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Table 3 
Deviation from optimal CEO ownership and firm value 
 
This table reports firm fixed effect regressions on the deviation from optimal CEO ownership and firm value. The 
intercepts are not reported in this table. Deviation is the absolute value of the residuals, where univariate statistics 
of the residuals is reported in Table 2. Above-optimal dummy is one if actual CEO ownership is greater than 
optimal CEO ownership, and is zero otherwise. Tobin’s Q is the market value of equity plus the book value of 
assets minus the book value of common equity, divided by the book value of assets. Size is the natural logarithm of 
the book value of assets. Cash flow is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to assets. Sales growth is the 
growth rate of sales, calculated as the change in sales divided by the level of sales in the previous year. Plant, 
property and equipment is the ratio of PPE to assets. R&D and advertising is the ratio of the sum of research and 
development expenses plus advertising expenses, divided by total expenses. Earnings volatility is the standard 
deviation of the ratio of income before extraordinary items to assets in the prior three years. Sales volatility is the 
standard deviation of the natural logarithm of sales in the prior three years. F-test refers to the F test on the null 
hypothesis that the sum of the estimates on Deviation and Deviation * Above-optimal dummy is zero. The p-value 
is noted in brackets. 
 
 Tobin's Q Tobin's Q 
Deviation -5.658 -5.998 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Deviation * Above-optimal dummy  0.851 
  (0.44) 
Size -1.839 -1.842 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Size square 0.042 0.043 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash flow 4.338 4.340 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash flow square 16.737 16.732 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Sales growth 0.375 0.376 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Plant, property and equipment 0.034 0.034 
 (0.48) (0.47) 
R&D and advertising 0.489 0.489 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Earnings volatility 0.338 0.335 
 (0.30) (0.31) 
Sales volatility -0.197 -0.196 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
F-test (p-value)  0.01 
Adjusted R-square 0.92 0.92 
 
 
 
 
 38
Table 4 
Size-adjusted deviation from optimal CEO ownership and firm value 
 
This table reports firm fixed effect regressions on the deviation from optimal CEO ownership and firm value. The 
intercepts are not reported in this table. Size-adjusted deviation is the deviations divided by firm size, which is the 
natural logarithm of the book value of assets. Above-optimal dummy is one if actual CEO ownership is greater than 
optimal CEO ownership, and is zero otherwise. Tobin’s Q is the market value of equity plus the book value of 
assets minus the book value of common equity, divided by the book value of assets. Size is the natural logarithm of 
the book value of assets. Cash flow is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to assets. Sales growth is the 
growth rate of sales, calculated as the change in sales divided by the level of sales in the previous year. Plant, 
property and equipment is the ratio of PPE to assets. R&D and advertising is the ratio of the sum of research and 
development expenses plus advertising expenses, divided by total expenses. Earnings volatility is the standard 
deviation of the ratio of income before extraordinary items to assets in the prior three years. Sales volatility is the 
standard deviation of the natural logarithm of sales in the prior three years. F-test refers to the F test on the null 
hypothesis that the sum of the estimates on Size-adjusted deviation and Size-adjusted deviation * Above-optimal 
dummy is zero. The p-value is noted in brackets. 
 
  
 Tobin's Q Tobin's Q 
Size-adjusted deviation -1.040 -1.110 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Size-adjusted deviation * Above-optimal dummy  0.171 
  (0.45) 
Size -1.851 -1.852 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Size square 0.043 0.043 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash flow 4.337 4.339 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash flow square 16.735 16.732 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Sales growth 0.376 0.377 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Plant, property and equipment 0.034 0.034 
 (0.47) (0.47) 
R&D and advertising 0.490 0.491 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Earnings volatility 0.339 0.336 
 (0.30) (0.31) 
Sales volatility -0.197 -0.196 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
F-test (p-value)  0.01 
Adjusted R-square 0.92 0.92 
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Table 5 
CEO ownership and firm value 
 
This table reports a firm fixed effect regression on CEO ownership and firm value. The intercepts are not reported 
in this table.  CEO ownership is defined as the sum of the proportion of shares outstanding held by the CEO plus 
the proportion of shares outstanding in options held by the CEO times the Black-Scholes hedge ratio (the delta). 
Tobin’s Q is the market value of equity plus the book value of assets minus the book value of common equity, 
divided by the book value of assets. Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of assets. Cash flow is the ratio 
of income before extraordinary items to assets. Sales growth is the growth rate of sales, calculated as the change in 
sales divided by the level of sales in the previous year. Plant, property and equipment is the ratio of PPE to assets. 
R&D and advertising is the ratio of the sum of research and development expenses plus advertising expenses, 
divided by total expenses. Earnings volatility is the standard deviation of the ratio of income before extraordinary 
items to assets in the prior three years. Sales volatility is the standard deviation of the natural logarithm of sales in 
the prior three years. The p-value is noted in brackets. 
 
 
 Tobin's Q 
CEO ownership 0.369 
 (0.37) 
Size -1.737 
 (0.01) 
Size square 0.040 
 (0.01) 
Cash flow 4.329 
 (0.01) 
Cash flow square 16.769 
 (0.01) 
Sales growth 0.380 
 (0.01) 
Plant, property and equipment 0.034 
 (0.47) 
R&D and advertising 0.506 
 (0.01) 
Earnings volatility 0.354 
 (0.28) 
Sales volatility -0.197 
 (0.07) 
Adjusted R-square 0.92 
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Table 6 
Univariate statistics on the events of change in CEO ownership 
 
This table reports univariate statistics on the events of change in CEO ownership. We obtain the data from the 
Thomson Financial database and the Securities Data Corporation database over the period from 1996 to 2000. We 
study four events that alter the proportion of CEO ownership: insider selling (1266 events), insider purchase (303 
events), seasoned equity offerings (267 events), and open market repurchases (1184 events). Panel A reports 
abnormal return around the events. Abnormal return is calculated as the cumulative abnormal return by using the 
market model with the CRSP equally weighted index as the market return. Abnormal return for insider selling is 
calculated by using the window of (-5, +10) days around the date that the transaction is reported to the SEC. 
Abnormal return for insider purchase is calculated by using the window of (-1, +4) days around the date that the 
transaction is reported to the SEC. Abnormal return for SEOs is calculated by using the window of (-10, +10) days 
around the announcement date. Abnormal return for open market repurchases is calculated by using the window of  
(-5, +5) days around the announcement date. Panel B reports univariate statistics on run-up. Run-up is the sum of the 
firm’s monthly return in the interval -6 to -1 months.  
 
 
Panel A. Abnormal return around insider selling, insider purchase, seasoned equity offerings, and open market 
repurchases 
 
 Abnormal return 
 Mean Median Mean test  
(p-value) 
Median test 
(p-value) 
 
Insider selling  
 
-0.0067 
 
-0.0040 
 
0.03 
 
0.02 
 
Insider purchase 
 
0.0269 
 
0.0216 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 
 
SEOs 
 
-0.0178 
 
-0.0172 
 
0.03 
 
0.01 
 
Open market repurchases 
 
0.0135 
 
0.0182 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 
 
 
 
Panel B. Univariate statistics on run-up 
 
 Run-up 
 Mean Median 
 
Insider selling  
 
0.3057 
 
0.2554 
 
Insider purchase 
 
-0.1903 
 
-0.1857 
 
SEOs 
 
0.3330 
 
0.2649 
 
Open market repurchases 
 
0.0196 
 
0.0429 
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Table 7 
Deviation from optimal CEO ownership  
and abnormal return around the change in CEO ownership 
 
This table reports the deviation from optimal CEO ownership and abnormal return around the change in CEO 
ownership. We study four events that alter the proportion of CEO ownership: insider selling (1266 events), insider 
purchase (303 events), seasoned equity offerings (267 events), and open market repurchases (1184 events).  Panel 
A reports the results of the univariate analysis. Abnormal return is calculated as the cumulative abnormal return by 
using the market model with the CRSP equally weighted index as the market return. Appendix A provides the 
details for the calculation of the cumulative abnormal return for each event. Panel B reports the results of 
regressions. Above-optimal dummy t-1 is one if actual CEO ownership is greater than optimal CEO ownership in 
the year t-1, and is zero otherwise. Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of assets. Cash flow is the ratio 
of income before extraordinary items to assets. Sales growth is the growth rate of sales, calculated as the change in 
sales divided by the level of sales in the previous year. Plant, property and equipment is the ratio of PPE to assets. 
R&D and advertising is the ratio of the sum of research and development expenses plus advertising expenses, 
divided by total expenses. Earnings volatility is the standard deviation of the ratio of income before extraordinary 
items to assets in the prior three years. Sales volatility is the standard deviation of the natural logarithm of sales in 
the prior three years. Run-up is the sum of the firm’s monthly return in the interval -6 to -1 months. Panel C reports 
the results of regressions with more control variables. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to assets. Cash 
holdings are the ratio of cash and marketable securities to assets. The p-value is noted in brackets. 
 
Panel A. Univariate analysis 
 
 Mean of abnormal return (p-value) 
 Sub-sample:  
Below-optimal deviation in year t-1 
Sub-sample:  
Above-optimal deviation in year t-1 
Insider selling -0.0127 
(0.01) 
-0.0012 
(0.78) 
Insider purchase 0.0340 
(0.01) 
0.0189 
(0.01) 
SEOs -0.0342 
(0.01) 
-0.0013 
(0.92) 
Open market repurchases 0.0171 
(0.01) 
0.0087 
(0.08) 
 
Panel B. Regressions 
 
 Abnormal return 
 
Insider selling Insider 
purchase 
SEOs 
 
Open market 
repurchases 
Intercept -0.022 0.030 -0.030 0.022 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) 
Above-optimal dummy t-1 0.011 -0.020 0.036 -0.012 
 (0.08) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) 
Size change 0.033 -0.026 0.013 -0.035 
 (0.02) (0.28) (0.64) (0.04) 
Cash flow change 0.077 0.066 0.211 0.088 
 (0.11) (0.33) (0.19) (0.11) 
Sales growth change 0.033 0.015 0.053 0.023 
 (0.04) (0.48) (0.08) (0.13) 
Property, plant and equipment change 0.011 0.014 -0.035 -0.012 
 (0.65) (0.50) (0.20) (0.68) 
R&D and advertising change 0.027 -0.050 0.005 -0.065 
 (0.63) (0.58) (0.97) (0.19) 
Earnings volatility change 0.262 0.207 -0.662 -0.226 
 (0.01) (0.15) (0.04) (0.06) 
Sales volatility change -0.001 0.006 -0.098 0.028 
 (0.98) (0.89) (0.26) (0.38) 
Run-up 0.002 -0.035 -0.034 -0.001 
 (0.76) (0.02) (0.13) (0.93) 
Adjusted R-square 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.01 
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Panel C. Regressions with more control variables 
 
 Abnormal return 
 
Insider selling 
  
Insider 
purchase 
SEOs 
 
Open market 
repurchases 
Intercept -0.072 0.033 -0.107 0.027 
 (0.09) (0.69) (0.45) (0.52) 
Above-optimal dummy t-1 0.010 -0.024 0.036 -0.012 
 (0.09) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) 
Size change 0.031 -0.073 0.061 -0.054 
 (0.08) (0.03) (0.14) (0.01) 
Cash flow change 0.061 0.054 0.229 0.072 
 (0.22) (0.48) (0.20) (0.22) 
Sales growth change 0.027 0.078 -0.040 0.052 
 (0.26) (0.03) (0.48) (0.04) 
Property, plant and equipment change 0.015 0.030 -0.054 0.001 
 (0.52) (0.22) (0.13) (0.97) 
R&D change 0.005 -0.083 -0.013 -0.055 
 (0.92) (0.39) (0.91) (0.27) 
Earnings volatility change 0.235 0.645 -0.749 -0.235 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.08) 
Sales volatility change 0.005 0.015 -0.048 0.023 
 (0.89) (0.74) (0.60) (0.48) 
Run-up 0.003 -0.031 -0.046 0.001 
 (0.71) (0.05) (0.06) (0.94) 
Size t-1 0.003 -0.002 0.004 -0.0002 
 (0.15) (0.66) (0.49) (0.93) 
Cash flow t-1 -0.044 0.196 -0.158 -0.044 
 (0.31) (0.04) (0.31) (0.43) 
Sales growth t-1 -0.006 0.076 -0.113 0.044 
 (0.80) (0.07) (0.06) (0.12) 
R&D t-1 -0.017 -0.087 -0.042 0.012 
 (0.31) (0.01) (0.43) (0.53) 
Earnings volatility t-1 -0.005 0.610 -0.022 -0.011 
 (0.94) (0.01) (0.94) (0.92) 
Leverage t-1 -0.027 0.050 0.013 -0.024 
 (0.29) (0.14) (0.82) (0.30) 
Cash holdings t-1 0.043 0.051 0.084 0.031 
 (0.03) (0.31) (0.21) (0.26) 
Adjusted R-square 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.01 
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Table 8 
Heckman two-stage estimation  
First stage: Probit regressions 
 
This table reports the first stage of the Heckman two-stage estimation. The probit regressions are reported in the 
table. The sample consists of 1058 firms that are continuously in the Execucomp database from 1995 to 2000. We 
study four events that alter the proportion of CEO ownership: insider selling (1266 events), insider purchase (303 
events), seasoned equity offerings (267 events), and open market repurchases (1184 events).   The dependent 
variable is 1 if the event takes place, and is 0 otherwise. Above-optimal dummy t-1 is one if actual CEO ownership is 
greater than optimal CEO ownership in the year t-1, and is zero otherwise. Size is the natural logarithm of the book 
value of assets. Sales growth is the growth rate of sales, calculated as the change in sales divided by the level of sales 
in the previous year. R&D and advertising is the ratio of the sum of research and development expenses plus 
advertising expenses, divided by total expenses. Stock return is one-year stock return. Stock return volatility is the 
annualized standard deviation of monthly return during the year. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to assets. 
Cash flow is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to assets. Earnings volatility is the standard deviation of 
the ratio of income before extraordinary items to assets in the prior three years. Cash holdings are the ratio of cash 
and marketable securities to assets. The p-value is noted in brackets. 
 
 
 The dependent variable is 1 if the event takes place, and is 0 otherwise. 
 
Insider 
selling  
Insider 
purchase  SEOs 
Open market 
repurchases 
Intercept -2.872 -2.768 Intercept 1.497 -1.374 
 (0.01) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.01) 
Above-optimal dummy t-1 0.172 0.024 Above-optimal dummy t-1 0.100 -0.073 
 (0.01) (0.70)  (0.24) (0.08) 
Size t-1 0.061 0.036 Size t-1 -0.155 0.029 
 (0.01) (0.06)  (0.01) (0.03) 
Sales growth t-1 0.639 0.248 Sales growth t-1 1.105 -0.252 
 (0.01) (0.11)  (0.01) (0.02) 
R&D and advertising t-1 1.104 0.123 Leverage t-1 1.006 -0.529 
 (0.01) (0.52)  (0.01) (0.01) 
Stock return t-1 0.644 -0.591 Cash flow t-1 0.453 2.914 
 (0.01) (0.01)  (0.52) (0.01) 
Stock return volatility t-1 0.271 0.804 Earnings volatility t-1 -0.350 0.455 
 (0.03) (0.01)  (0.78) (0.45) 
   Cash holdings t-1 0.439 -0.142 
    (0.27) (0.44) 
   Stock return t-1 1.073 -0.015 
    (0.01) (0.79) 
   Stock return volatility t-1 0.448 -0.264 
    (0.13) (0.05) 
Cox and Snell R-square 0.07 0.02 Cox and Snell R-square 0.14 0.03 
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Table 9 
Heckman two-stage estimation  
Second stage: Deviation from optimal CEO ownership and abnormal return 
 
This table reports the second stage of the Heckman two-stage estimation. This table shows the deviation from 
optimal CEO ownership and abnormal return around the change of CEO ownership. We examine four events that 
alter the proportion of CEO ownership: insider selling (1266 events), insider purchase (303 events), seasoned equity 
offerings (267 events), and open market repurchases (1184 events).  Panel A reports the regressions. Abnormal 
return is calculated as the cumulative abnormal return by using the market model with the CRSP equally weighted 
index as the market return. Appendix A provides the details for the calculation of the cumulative abnormal return for 
each event. Above-optimal dummy t-1 is one if actual CEO ownership is greater than optimal CEO ownership in the 
year t-1, and is zero otherwise. Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of assets. Cash flow is the ratio of 
income before extraordinary items to assets. Sales growth is the growth rate of sales, calculated as the change in 
sales divided by the level of sales in the previous year. Plant, property and equipment is the ratio of PPE to assets. 
R&D and advertising is the ratio of the sum of research and development expenses plus advertising expenses, 
divided by total expenses. Earnings volatility is the standard deviation of the ratio of income before extraordinary 
items to assets in the prior three years. Sales volatility is the standard deviation of the natural logarithm of sales in the 
prior three years. Run-up is the sum of the firm’s monthly return in the interval -6 to -1 months. Inverse Mills ratio is 
obtained from the first stage of the Heckman two-stage estimation, which is reported in Table 8. Panel B reports the 
regressions with more control variables. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to assets. Cash holdings are the ratio 
of cash and marketable securities to assets. The p-value is noted in brackets. 
 
Panel A. Regressions 
 
 Abnormal return 
 
 
Insider selling Insider purchase SEOs 
Open market 
repurchases 
Intercept -0.041 0.069 -0.004 0.026 
 (0.03) (0.13) (0.91) (0.32) 
Above-optimal dummy t-1 0.013 -0.021 0.035 -0.011 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.07) 
Size change 0.039 -0.017 0.001 -0.035 
 (0.01) (0.51) (0.96) (0.04) 
Cash flow change 0.083 0.070 0.182 0.091 
 (0.09) (0.30) (0.27) (0.11) 
Sales growth change 0.027 0.016 0.065 0.023 
 (0.10) (0.45) (0.06) (0.13) 
Property, plant and equipment change 0.009 0.015 -0.030 -0.014 
 (0.71) (0.49) (0.29) (0.65) 
R&D and advertising change 0.023 -0.054 0.005 -0.065 
 (0.67) (0.56) (0.96) (0.19) 
Earnings volatility change 0.253 0.192 -0.641 -0.221 
 (0.01) (0.19) (0.05) (0.07) 
Sales volatility change -0.001 0.006 -0.114 0.028 
 (0.98) (0.89) (0.21) (0.38) 
Run-up 0.005 -0.033 -0.042 -0.001 
 (0.53) (0.04) (0.09) (0.92) 
Inverse Mills ratio 0.012 -0.019 -0.016 -0.003 
 (0.28) (0.39) (0.44) (0.88) 
Adjusted R-square 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.01 
 
 45
Panel B. Regressions with more control variables 
 
 Abnormal return 
 Insider selling Insider purchase SEO 
Open market 
repurchases 
Intercept -0.191 0.091 -0.143 0.007 
 (0.01) (0.36) (0.31) (0.96) 
Above-optimal dummy t-1 0.014 -0.025 0.029 -0.012 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.07) (0.09) 
Size change 0.035 -0.064 0.056 -0.046 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.18) (0.03) 
Cash flow change 0.069 0.071 0.137 0.078 
 (0.19) (0.36) (0.45) (0.19) 
Sales growth change 0.032 0.078 -0.047 0.039 
 (0.20) (0.03) (0.41) (0.10) 
Property, plant and equipment change 0.016 0.031 -0.053 -0.005 
 (0.52) (0.21) (0.13) (0.87) 
R&D change 0.016 -0.094 -0.017 -0.056 
 (0.77) (0.34) (0.89) (0.26) 
Earnings volatility change 0.264 0.635 -0.788 -0.234 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.09) 
Sales volatility change 0.005 0.014 -0.065 0.027 
 (0.89) (0.75) (0.47) (0.40) 
Run-up 0.008 -0.028 -0.064 0.001 
 (0.37) (0.07) (0.01) (0.96) 
Size t-1 0.005 -0.002 0.012 0.0002 
 (0.01) (0.60) (0.09) (0.94) 
Cash flow t-1 -0.040 0.221 -0.245 -0.023 
 (0.38) (0.02) (0.13) (0.88) 
Sales growth t-1 0.015 0.075 -0.187 0.029 
 (0.61) (0.07) (0.01) (0.41) 
R&D t-1 0.007 -0.092 -0.055 0.011 
 (0.75) (0.01) (0.30) (0.55) 
Earnings volatility t-1 0.019 0.598 -0.109 -0.014 
 (0.81) (0.01) (0.68) (0.91) 
Leverage t-1 -0.034 0.051 -0.022 -0.027 
 (0.21) (0.14) (0.70) (0.46) 
Cash holdings t-1 0.046 0.057 0.051 0.033 
 (0.03) (0.26) (0.45) (0.27) 
Inverse Mills ratio 0.034 -0.025 -0.062 0.009 
 (0.04) (0.27) (0.03) (0.89) 
Adjusted R-square 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.01 
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Table 10 
Deviation from optimal CEO ownership and abnormal return  
around insider selling: Robustness check 
 
This table reports the regressions about the deviation from optimal CEO ownership and abnormal return around insider 
selling. We examine 1266 events of insider selling. Abnormal return is calculated as the cumulative abnormal return by 
using the market model with the CRSP equally weighted index as the market return. Abnormal return for insider selling is 
calculated by using the window of (-5, +10) days around the date that the transaction is reported to the SEC. Above-
optimal dummy t-1 is one if actual CEO ownership is greater than optimal CEO ownership in the year t-1, and is zero 
otherwise. Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of assets. Cash flow is the ratio of income before extraordinary 
items to assets. Sales growth is the growth rate of sales, calculated as the change in sales divided by the level of sales in 
the previous year. Plant, property and equipment is the ratio of PPE to assets. R&D and advertising is the ratio of the sum 
of research and development expenses plus advertising expenses, divided by total expenses. Earnings volatility is the 
standard deviation of the ratio of income before extraordinary items to assets in the prior three years. Sales volatility is the 
standard deviation of the natural logarithm of sales in the prior three years. Run-up is the sum of the firm’s monthly return 
in the interval -6 to -1 months. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to assets. Cash holdings are the ratio of cash and 
marketable securities to assets. Option exercise dummy is one if insider selling is associated with option exercises, and is 
zero otherwise. Inverse Mills ratio is obtained from the first stage of the Heckman two-stage estimation, which is reported 
in Table 8. The p-value is noted in brackets. 
 
 Abnormal return 
 Insider selling Insider selling 
Intercept -0.092 -0.203 
 (0.03) (0.01) 
Above-optimal dummy t-1 0.011 0.013 
 (0.07) (0.06) 
Size change 0.028 0.035 
 (0.10) (0.07) 
Cash flow change 0.077 0.072 
 (0.11) (0.18) 
Sales growth change 0.024 0.032 
 (0.28) (0.20) 
Property, plant and equipment change 0.026 0.015 
 (0.26) (0.57) 
R&D change 0.019 0.016 
 (0.72) (0.78) 
Earnings volatility change 0.257 0.273 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Sales volatility change 0.001 0.003 
 (0.98) (0.95) 
Run-up 0.008 0.009 
 (0.30) (0.28) 
Size t-1 0.004 0.006 
 (0.04) (0.01) 
Cash flow t-1 -0.020 -0.040 
 (0.63) (0.39) 
Sales growth t-1 -0.006 0.013 
 (0.81) (0.66) 
R&D t-1 -0.014 0.013 
 (0.38) (0.59) 
Earnings volatility t-1 -0.006 0.034 
 (0.94) (0.66) 
Leverage t-1 -0.026 -0.029 
 (0.29) (0.29) 
Cash holdings t-1 0.035 0.045 
 (0.06) (0.03) 
Option exercise dummy -0.010 -0.012 
 (0.09) (0.07) 
Inverse Mills ratio  0.034 
  (0.05) 
Adjusted R-square 0.03 0.03 
 
